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 4 
Specifi c Trade Costs, 
Quality, and Import Prices
Benjamin Bridgman
Bureau of Economic Analysis
Recently, quality differences among internationally traded goods 
have received significant attention. Differing import quality across mar-
kets, characterized by lower-income countries producing lower-quality 
products, is a robust empirical finding.1 Johnson (2011) shows that qual-
ity differences account for most firm heterogeneity in trade. Baldwin 
and Harrigan (2011) argue that, in order to match the data, trade models 
must account for such differences. However, international price indices 
frequently cannot make quality adjustments. Correctly accounting for 
quality differences is important to the measurement of real trade, since 
mismeasurement of trade filters into other indicators such as real GDP 
and productivity. (See Feenstra et al. [2013], Houseman [2007], and 
Houseman et al. [2011].)
While quality measurement is an issue for all price indices, it is a 
particular challenge for international prices. There has been a significant 
increase in the number of goods that are traded. A large number of 
goods that are traded are only traded intermittently. The “new goods 
problem”—determining the quality of new goods relative to previ-
ously traded ones—is a frequent issue in international prices. A lack of 
quantifiable characteristics or agency resources often prevents explicit 
adjustments for quality, such as hedonics.
Statistical agencies have developed techniques to deal with environ-
ments with shifting sets of goods. A common way of accounting for the 
quality of newly measured goods is matched modeling. If an explicit 
adjustment for quality cannot be done, a good may be matched to a 
similar good. The price difference is attributed to quality differences.
To avoid having frequent replacement of goods in the sample, sam-
pling techniques intentionally focus on consistently traded goods. Price 
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changes of consistently traded goods within a category stand in for 
price changes of all goods in that category.
I examine these techniques in light of recent advances in trade 
theory. I use a version of the model in Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) 
to show theoretically that both methods are vulnerable to mismeasure-
ment for goods with quality differences that pay specific (per-unit) trade 
costs. I then analyze the quantitative impact of these forces using U.S. 
import data.
I show theoretically that matched modeling will tend to overstate 
quality differences between goods. Specific trade costs weaken the link 
between price and quality. Prices are set as markup over production and 
trade costs. Lower-quality goods cost less to produce, and all goods pay 
the same specific cost regardless of quality. Therefore, a bigger share 
of a low-quality good’s price is due to trade costs. The price difference 
between goods will be smaller than their quality differences. Using 
matched modeling will tend to overstate real imports of new goods. 
Since matched modeling overstates the quality of new goods, it under-
estimates the (quality-adjusted) price.
Dropping intermittently traded goods will tend to underestimate 
price changes. Specific trade costs systematically make goods that 
enter and exit different from continuing goods. Lower-quality goods 
are the least profitable, so they are the most sensitive to cost changes. 
Relatively small cost changes can make a previously profitable market 
unprofitable, and vice versa. Low-quality goods are more likely to be 
traded intermittently, and the prices of these intermittently traded low-
quality goods are likewise more sensitive to cost shocks.
I show that the quantitative impact of this mismeasurement can 
be significant: in some cases, applying matched modeling leads to 
significant overstatement of the quality of new goods. For leather foot-
wear, a major import category, matched modeling understates the quality 
gap between the highest- and lowest-quality goods by over 30 percent. 
However, the average impact has fallen over the period of 1974–2004, 
since transportation costs, which tend to be specific, have fallen.
The impact of dropping intermittently traded goods from the sam-
ple has likely increased. The size of the effect is proportional to the 
price gap between continuing and newly traded goods, a gap that has 
widened. By 2004, the model predicts that newly traded goods’ prices 
were twice as sensitive to cost shocks as previously traded ones.
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This chapter is part of a literature that examines mismeasurement of 
international prices. Feenstra and Romalis (2012) also examine interna-
tional prices with specific trade costs. However, their focus is on macro-
level data, while I analyze the micro-level data and the techniques used 
by statistical agencies. A number of papers have examined diffi culties 
in matched modeling. Reinsdorf and Yuskavage (2011) examine coun-
try substitution bias, which arises when imports are sourced from new 
countries with different price levels. Gagnon, Mandel, and Vigfusson 
(2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) look at whether the ten-
dency to introduce price changes at product introduction biases import 
price indices. This chapter is complementary to those papers, as it looks 
at a different mechanism. Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2012) exam-
ine whether entry and exit in response to exchange rates dampen the 
pass-through of exchange rate fluctuations. The mechanism is similar, 
though they do not examine its impact on statistical agency methods.
A theoretical literature examines how to accommodate new goods 
in international price measurement. Feenstra (1994) derives a method of 
calculating the ideal price index with new goods. This chapter focuses 
on statistical agency practice and does not deal with welfare.
MODEL
The model is adapted fr om that found in Bridgman (2013). This 
model is based on the Quality Heterogeneous Firm Trade (QHFT) 
model developed by Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) and is similar to that 
of Gervais (2008).
Households
There are J number of countries.  The preferences of the representa-
tive household in each country is given by the following equation:










   
 
  ,
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whe re cj (i) is units consumed of variety i in country j, and Ωj is the set 
of available varieties. The preference parameters q(i) are the quality of 
the variety and σ > 1. The household is endowed with L units of labor.
Productio n
Consumption goods are produced using labor. The wage in country 
j is wj. There is a constant set of firms, each endowed with a technology 
to produce a variety. Output of a variety is




  . 
Higher-cost firms produce higher-quality goods. A firm with unit cost a 
produces a good of quality q according to the following equation:
(4.2)     1q i a i   ,
where θ > 0. The assumption that θ > 0 implies that the consumer’s valu-
ation of quality increases faster than marginal cost, so profit increases in 
marginal cost. Baldwin and Harrigan (2011) argue that the data support 
this assumption. Following Eaton, Kortum, and Sotelo (2012), profits 
are spent outside the economy.
Trade
There are three costs to export a variety. There is a market-entry 
fixed cost of  fodF i  units of labor to export variety i from origin country o to destination country d. There is a specific (per-unit) cost with unit 
labor requirement  sodF i . Finally, there is an ad valorem charge τod(i). 
Given a mill price pod(i), consumers pay delivered price 
        1 .sd od od o odp i p i i w F i  
Sol ution
This section characterizes the solution but does not fully solve it. 
A full solution to the model would require specifying a distribution of 
unit costs. Since the results do not require a distribution, I do not fully 
close the model.
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Each representative household chooses cj (i) for ji  to maximize Equation (4.1) subject to
   
j
j j ji




For varieties that are available in a market, expenditure in destination 
country d is given by 
































    
       
  
is the quality-adjusted price index of destination country d. The demand 
function in terms of the mill price pod(i) in origin country o for a good 
exported to destination country d is 
           1 1 sd od od od o od dc p i q i p i i w F i B


          
.
Firms are monopolistic competitors that set prices to maximize 
profits. They can set different prices for each market. As a simplifying 
assumption, the firm takes the price index P as given.2 The optimal mill 
price pod(i) is the solution to
(4.5) 
 
           max
od
f
od d od o d od od op i
p i c p i w a i c p i F i w 
 
.
The mill price solution is










    
 ,
which generates the delivered price   




wp i a i i F i 

    
 .
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The firm will only export if profits are nonnegative. The goods that are 
available are determined by whether it is profitable to sell to the market. 
A variety i will be exported from origin country o to destination country 
d if
(4.6)  







a i B F i w





    
       
 .
SAMPLING
In this chapter, I attempt to match the model to how international 
prices are actually collected. Statistical agencies cannot collect price 
data for all goods that are traded. They must use a sample to stand in for 
nonsampled goods. In this section, I describe the sampling process the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) uses for its International Price Pro-
gram (IPP).3 The BLS’s sampling process is the most germane, since 
the empirical work examines U.S. trade. The sampling techniques and 
constraints faced are similar at other statistical agencies, s o much of the 
description applies to other countries.
Selecting Quotes
Based on trade data, the BLS sets a sample to determine the num-
ber of price quotes needed for each item. The BLS then selects a set of 
companies to ask for quotes and determines which quotes to ask of each 
company. A field economist then approaches the company to determine 
the particular products that will be priced.
The BLS sets a number of goals for its price program and faces a 
number of constraints when setting its sample. Therefore, the sampling 
is not a pure proportional probability sample, but a compromise that 
attempts to achieve its goals within the constraints.
The sample is designed to get prices covering total trade as well as 
a number of subaggregate price indices. Therefore, it will oversample 
some products to maintain suffi cient coverage of those subindices.
The survey is voluntary and requires the ongoing cooperation of 
importers or exporters. Resource constraints restrict the number of 
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new prices that can be gathered and how often the sample is reset. It is 
more diffi cult to obtain prices from intermittently traded products, since 
items that trade too infrequently do not yield usable price changes, so 
field economists focus on items that are regularly traded. Firms that are 
involved in trade intermittently tend to cooperate with data collection 
less frequently; therefore, the survey design intentionally downweights 
such products and companies.
Not all intermittent trade is due to the effects identified in this chap-
ter. For import prices, the BLS does not have jurisdiction to ask overseas 
exporters for price data. A foreign company’s goods may be imported 
consistently, just not by the same importer. Since the BLS can only 
track the importer’s side of the relationship, the goods from that foreign 
company will be intermittently traded in the sample. Some goods, like 
machinery installed in a new factory, are only demanded irregularly.
Quote Replacement
Quotes will drop out and need to be replaced periodically. There is 
both planned and forced substitution.
Planned substitution is replacement built into the sampling design. 
The sample is reset periodically to reflect changes in the set of products 
that are traded. Old items are cycled out and replaced by items in the 
new sample. Forced substitution is due to a product being discontin-
ued or a firm ceasing business. In such cases, the field economist will 
attempt to get a replacement quote from the trading firm if possible.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) report that about half of the quotes 
that drop out do so because of forced substitution and that a quarter 
drop out because of planned substitution. The remaining quarter are 
cases where the firm ceases to provide quotes and gives no reason for 
stopping. Depending on factors such as how much longer the item was 
to be included in the sample, the item may either be replaced by a new 
quote from a different firm or discontinued.
If there is a forced substitution and the new item is substantially 
different, the reporter is asked for the value of change so it can be sub-
tracted from the new item’s price, a process called “linking.” Gagnon, 
Mandel, and Vigfusson (2012) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) 
argue that this method is used relatively infrequently. If a new item is 
added (as in a planned substitution), there is no item with which to link. 
up15shmg10ch4.indd   127 2/17/2015   11:31:01 AM
128   Bridgman
When the import prices are put together by the BEA to deflate trade, 
quality adjustments are made to a few items, largely durable goods, 
where established hedonic methods are available (BEA 2011).
Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) argue that since explicit quality 
adjustment is done infrequently, import/export prices are approximately 
matched-model indices. That is, level differences between items within 
an index are attributed to quality differences and omitted. Of course, 
the data collection does not explicitly use matched modeling. However, 
quotes are often added to a cell without quality adjustment, and level 
differences between items do not get included. From the standpoint of 
the theory, this method is equivalent to matched modeling.
RESULTS
This section examines the theoretical diffi culties in adjusting for 
quality. Specifically, I examine matched modeling and the problems 
posed by sampling intermittently traded goods less frequently. I show 
that specific trade costs interfere with the assumptions that support the 
use of these methods.
In the subsections that follow, I will focus on how statistical agen-
cies measure international price change. The BLS uses a Laspeyres 
index for its import price indices (BLS 1997). The expression for the 
index measuring a price change from period 0 to period t is











w i p i
  
,
where ω0      ,0 ,0od di p i c i .
This measure is distinct from the theoretical price index that mea-
sures the welfare effects of price change. The BLS (1997) states explic-
itly that the purpose of the international price indices is not to measure 
welfare.
To isolate the differential impact of costs on price across goods of 
different qualities, I assume throughout this section that trade costs are 
the same for all varieties.
ω
ω0
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Matched Modeling
Matched modeling works off the assumption that if two simi-
lar goods are available in the market at different prices, the price gap 
reflects differences in quality. We can recover the quality gap between 
an existing and a new good by examining the price gap. In this section, 
I show that specific costs weaken the link between price and quality.
Without specific costs (Fs = 0), prices closely reflect quality. The 
relationship between unit cost a(i) and quality q(i) can be written as
   
1
1a i q i  . 
The relative price of two goods i and i′ that only differ in quality is









p i q i
p i q iq i w
 
     
 .
In this case, matched modeling works well. As long as wages paid by 
the producers of the two products are the same, the price difference 
reflects only quality differences. If a comparison good from a producer 
with similar input costs can be found (for example, from the same coun-
try), matched modeling is a practical method for dealing with the new-
goods problem.4
This clear relationship between price and quality breaks down with 
specific costs. The relative price is now

































As the specific cost term increases, prices are determined more by 
trade costs than by quality. Breaking the relationship between price and 
quality makes matched modeling more diffi cult. In matched modeling, 
the price gap between an old and a new good is attributed to quality. As 
Proposition 1 shows, this method underestimates the quality gap. 
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        
      
 .
This condition holds if








a H a HFa H




      
                     
. 







and θ > 0 by assumption.
The specific cost sodF  has more influence on the price of low-quality goods. Therefore, the price difference will be smaller than qual-
ity differences. New goods are of lower quality than prices indicate. 
This force will tend to overstate the real value of new goods imports.
Sampling
As long as the nonsampled prices move in the same way as the 
sampled goods, this method gives accurate price measures. However, 
specific trade costs can introduce differences. Newly and intermittently 
traded goods are likely to have systematically lower quality than con-
tinuing goods. These lower-quality goods react to trade cost changes 
differently, so deflating these goods by prices of high-quality goods can 
lead to mismeasurement. 
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Quality of new goods 
Newly traded goods tend to be of lower quality than continuing 
goods. Since lower-quality goods are the least profitable, they are the 
most sensitive to cost changes. High-quality-goods exporters will serve 
even high-trade-cost markets, since they have high margins. Low-
margin exporters of low-quality goods are much closer to the zero-profit 
cutoff. Relatively small cost increases can make a market unprofitable, 
so these exporters are the most likely to exit.
In the paragraphs that follow, I will vary a cost and hold all other 




od t od tF F  , 
all other trade costs and wages are held constant: 
,
f
odF  1 ,
,ft od tF   τod, t +1 = τod,t , and , 1 ,o t o tw w   .
I define cutoff quality odq  as the quality level that sets Equation (4.6) at equality; however, changes in trade costs or input prices will change 
this cutoff. Lemma 1 shows that falling wages and trade costs (holding 
the other quantities constant) will lead to entry of low- quality goods.
Lemma 1: Holding all other quantities constant, if any of the fol-
lowing four conditions hold:
1) , 1 ,
s s
od t od tF F  ,
2) , 1 ,
f f
od t od tF F  ,
3) , 1 ,od t od t   , or
4) , 1 ,o t o tw w  ,
then , 1 ,od t od tq q   .
Proof: For proofs of the first three conditions, see Lemmas 2, 3, and 
4 in Bridgman (2013). For the proof of the final condition, rearranging 
the cutoff condition (Equation [4.6]) gives us
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(4.11)  
   






a i B F i w








   
 .
If , 1 ,o t o tw w  , the right-hand side of the condition falls. This decline is equivalent to the fixed cost ,
f
od tF  falling. Following the proof of Lemma 
3 in Bridgman (2013), this implies that , 1 ,od t od tq q  .
Qua lity and price changes 
The fact that new and intermittently traded goods are of lower qual-
ity would not be a problem for sampling if the price changes of low- and 
high-quality goods were the same. However, low-quality goods react 
more to cost changes than do high-quality goods. Since more of the 
price of low-quality goods reflects trade costs, these goods are more 
sensitive to changes in these costs. The prices of low-quality goods fall 
(rise) more when specific trade costs fall  (rise) than do the prices of 
higher-quality goods. I show this formally in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2: If a(H) > a(L) and either
1)  , 1 ,
s s
od t od tF F   or
2)  , 1 ,od t od t    ,
then 
   
 
   
 
1 1t t t t
t t
p L p L p H p H
p L p H
   .
Proof: Define Δp(i) by pt +1(i) = pt(i) + Δp(i). For the condition
   
 
   
 
1 1t t t t
t t
p L p L p H p H
p L p H





p L p H
p L p H
 
 .
up15shmg10ch4.indd   132 2/17/2015   11:31:02 AM
Specifi c Trade Costs, Quality, and Import Prices   133
If either trade cost  , ,orsod t od tF  changes,    p L p H   . Formally, if
, 1 ,
s s
od t od tF F   , then
    , 1 ,
1
s s
od t od tF Fp L p H

    

 , and if , 1 ,od t od t   , then
   
, 1 ,1 1
s s
od od
od t od t
F Fp L p H
 
    
 
. The condition holds if
   
1 1
t tp L p H
 . Since     ,a H a L    p H p L  and the 
condition holds.
Since they show more price volatility, dropping low-quality goods 
will tend to underestimate price changes. To see this more concretely, 
consider the case where both a high- and a low-quality good—c(H)
and c(L), respectively—are traded in a category, but only the high-
quality good is included in the sample. Suppose the specific cost falls 
 1s st tF F  . The measured price change for the category is 







w H w L p H
P
w i p H
  










t t t t
t
t t t ti i
w H p H w L p L
P










p L p H
p L p H
   . That implies that








t t t t
t t t ti i
w H p H w L p H
w i p H w i p H 
 
   
  










t t t t
t t t ti i
w H p H w L p L
w i p H w i p L 

   
.
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EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The previous section showed theoretically that specific trade costs 
can lead to mismeasurement. In this section, I examine how important 
this mismeasurement is empirically.
This section only performs an initial assessment of the empirical 
scope of the theoretical mechanisms. It does not “fix” the import price 
index. While I find that these mechanisms appear to have a quantitative 
impact in some cases, doing a full adjustment of the data will require 
additional work.
Data
The basic data I use in the data analysis are U.S. goods import data 
from the Census Bureau, as collected by Hummels (2007). These data 
give trade value on a customs value (FOB, or free on board), tariffs, 
freight charges, and weight of shipments from 1974 to 2004. A “good” 
is defi ned as an SITC Revision 2 item-and-country-of-origin pairing. 
There are a couple of caveats to using these data. First, they are 
not the data that are used by the BLS to calculate import price indices. 
The price concept I use is unit value (value per weight) rather than 
price per product.5 A product is much more aggregated compared to the 
prices used by statistical agencies, so it will likely underestimate the 
real impact of specific costs. Furthermore, the analysis does not cover 
all trade. Weight data only cover shipments brought in by water or air. 
Therefore, the portion of trade with Mexico and Canada shipped by rail 
or truck is excluded. Additionally, not all goods report a weight.
Despite the limitations of the data, they do have advantages that 
lead me to use them. Most importantly, they are publicly available, 
unlike the microdata. Quality variation across exporters and locations 
is a robust finding. (For example, see Bastos and Silva [2010]; Choi, 
Hummels, and Xiang [2009]; and Hummels and Klenow [2005].) There-
fore, country-level variation generates suffi cient quality differences to 
get a first-pass impact of quality difference on price measurement.
In the subsection that follows, I assume that tariffs are all ad valorem 
charges and that freight rates are all specific costs. That is, τod(i) is the 
tariff rate and  so odw F i  is freight charge per kilogram. Price pod(i) is unit value. Hummels and Skiba (2004), among many others, find that freight 
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rates are charged on a specific basis. Tariffs in the post–World War II 
era are typically charge d on an ad valorem basis.
Matched Modeling
As documented in Proposition 1, specific trade costs change the 
relationship between quality and price compared to the case without 
such costs. To get an empirical measure of this impact, I compare the 
model’s estimates of the cost parameter a(i) with and without specific 
costs. Since we know that specific costs are present, I will assume that 
the specific trade-cost model is the “true” model. I will use the ratio 
of the “true” a(i) and the estimate without these costs, as is usually 
assumed, as my indicator of quality mismeasurement.
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We can rewrite this equation as follows:
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Neglecting the impact of specific costs (setting Fs = 0) will give an 
estimate of â(i):







Taking the ratio gives us a measure of the overstatement of quality dif-
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Specific trade costs are more likely to be an issue when one or more of 
the following characteristics are present:
1) High specific-cost goods (high Fs)
2) Low-quality goods (low a(i))
3)  Inelastically demanded goods (low σ)
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Microanalysis 
I begin the empirical analysis by examining one good, leather foot-
wear, in detail. I selected this good for a number of reasons. It is one of 
the 10 largest import categories in the period examined. A wide variety 
of countries export this good to the United States, with the potential 
for significant quality differences. In addition, there are few observable 
attributes that can be used for hedonic quality adjustment. Therefore, 
there ma y be room for alternative methods such as the one proposed in 
this chapter.
I need a value of σ to estimate the mismeasurement. I use a value 
of 2.02, taken from Broda and Weinstein (2006).7 Table 4.1 reports the 
estimated a(i) ratio for Switzerland and Sri Lanka at the beginning and 
end of the sample period. I use these two countries since they represent 
the high and low ends of unit value, with Swiss exporters charging more 
than fi ve times the price of their Sri Lankan counterparts in 1974. This 
spread reflects the fact that the richer countries tend to export higher-
quality goods (Fajgelbaum, Grossman, and Helpman 2011).
In 1974, the impact of specific costs on mismeasurement is much 
stronger for Sri Lanka than it is for Switzerland. Price overstates qual-
ity by nearly 40 percent for Sri Lanka, whereas it overstates quality by 
only 4 percent for Switzerland. FOB prices are selected as a markup 
over production cost, which is correlated with quality, and over specific 
cost, which is not. For Switzerland, trade costs are low relative to price. 
Therefore, most of the price reflects production cost, which reflects 
quality. Specific costs relative to unit value are much higher for Sri 
Lanka, so more of the charged price is a markup over trade costs. In 
2004, Sri Lanka’s mismeasurement falls significantly. Specific costs 









Po 15.41 2.97 30.97 13.01
F swo 0.70 0.93 1.49 0.80
τ 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.11
â(i)
a(i) 1.04 1.37 1.05 1.06 
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, using data from Hummels (2007).
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relative to unit value are much lower. Switzerland and Sri Lanka are 
much more similar in cost structure, so prices are more reflective of 
quality.
If each good was mismeasured by the same amount, there would be 
no impact on matched modeling. As shown above, specific costs affect 
low-quality goods more, so we would not expect the impact to be the 
same. To measure the impact on measurement, we need to compare 
goods across producers. An issue with the trade data is that the produc-
ers are different countries, so input costs are unlikely to be the same. 
The price levels of wealthier countries tend to be higher, as a result of 
the “Penn effect.” (See Marquez, Thomas, and Land [2012] for a recent 
empirical confirmation of this effect.) Certainly, wages in Switzerland 
and Sri Lanka are different.
We can use the model to eliminate the wages from our estimates. If 
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In 1974, the unadjusted price ratio overstates the quality difference 



















In 2004, the overstatement falls to 1 percent. Since Swiss and Sri 
Lankan costs are more similar, so is the degree of mismeasurement. 
Therefore, the data better reflect the assumptions of matched modeling.
× ×
× ×
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Overstating the quality of new goods will overstate imports. The 
effect is strongest for low-quality goods. Therefore, this effect will tend 
to overstate the U.S. trade deficit. American producers tend to produce 
higher-quality goods, since the United States is a high-income country. 
U.S. imports have begun to shift to lower-income countries, for whom 
the effect is stronger. Therefore, imports are more likely to be over-
stated than exports.
The size of the mismeasurement is sensitive to the elasticity used. 
For example, the a(i) ratio for Sri Lanka in 1974 drops from 1.37 to 1.10 
if σ is increased from 2.02 to 4.00. On the other hand, the ratio jumps up 
to 2.24 if σ falls to 1.50. The elasticity governs the degree to which price 
is marked up over cost. For low values of σ (inelastic goods),  there are 
high markups that magnify the impact of specific costs.
Aggregate analysis 
I now turn to the aggregate effect on quality measurement. I use 
σ = 4 for all goods. This is the value Simonovska and Waugh (2011) 
settle on as a consensus value using U.S. data; the value is within the 
usual range used in the literature. This will tend to underestimate the 
impact, since more differentiated goods tend to have a lower value of σ.
The impact of specific costs is heterogeneous. The range is large, 
from a ratio of 1 (no distortion) to 3 (200 percent overstatement). 




 ratio over the sample is 1.039, with a standard devia-
tion of 0.067. The goods with the largest ratios are those shipped by air. 
The mismeasurement is larger for goods with high specific-trade costs. 
Since air charges are much larger than charges for goods shipped by 
water, goods shipped mostly or exclusively by air are more subject to 
this distortion.
So far, I have treated each good equally. To get a sense of the overall 
impact, Figure 4.1 plots the a(i) ratio against its share in total imports 
within the sample for 2004.8 The most distorted goods tend to be a 
smaller share of imports. However, there are a nu mber of goods that are 
relatively important that show significant distortion.
As a measure of the aggregate impact, I calculate a trade-weighted 
ratio of all goods:
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Figure 4.2 shows the weighted ratio, which declines from 1.029 
to 1.015. This decline follows the fall in freight rates documented in 
Hummels (2007). Of course, what matters for matched modeling is the 
relative mismeasurement within a category. As shown above with Sri 
Lankan shoes, the decline in specific costs will reduce the scope of this 
source of mismeasurement. Since the typical good’s price reflects its 

















Figure 4.1  Estimated Mismeasurement vs. Log Share of Total Imports 
for 2004 (σ = 4.00)
SOURCE: Author’s calculations, using data from Hummels (2007).
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The matched modeling issue may be important for at least some 
goods. There is reason to believe that this calculation underestimates 
the degree of mismeasurement. The data may understate actual specific 
costs. They do not include any other specific costs that accrue because 
of internal transportation and wholesale and retail trade. Rousslang and 
To (1993) find that internal trade barriers are significant. Internal trans-
portation costs are 37 percent of international rates. If any of these costs 
are specific, these estimates will be too low. Using Norwegian data, 
Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and Opromolla (2011) estimate that the median 
specific trade cost is 34 percent of a good’s value.
Using the same σ for all goods understates the impact on some dif-
ferentiated goods whose demands are less elastic than σ = 4. If we set 
σ at 2, the magnitude of the average mismeasurement increases to 9.9 
percent in 1974 and 5.4 percent in 2004.
Even if the impact for the average good is small, there are some 
goods for which it is likely to matter. Lower-income countries, which 
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tend to produce lower-quality goods, have become more important in 
U.S. imports. The shift to air transportation, which has much high er 
freight rates, has increased the specific cost for some goods.
Sampling
The sampling method is less likely to collect quotes for intermit-
tently traded goods, whereas the model predicts that new and intermit-
tently traded goods are of lower quality than continuing goods. I begin 
the analysis by examining whether these goods are of lower quality in 
the data. Though quality cannot be observed directly, there is evidence 
that such goods are of lower quality than continuing goods.
Goods that were not traded in the previous year have lower unit 
values. This set of goods includes both completely new goods and inter-
mittently traded goods that are imported again. Bridgman (2013) shows 
that newly traded goods enter at a lower unit value, while trade costs are 
similar across the two sets of goods.
Beginning with Besedes and Prusa (2006a,b), a growing literature 
has examined the duration of trading relationships. (See Besedes and 
Prusa [2010] for a survey.) This literature finds that most trade relation-
ships are very short, with the median product being traded for only a 
year. Lower exporter income, as measured by GDP per capita, is asso-
ciated with shorter trading relationships. As discussed above, lower-
income countries tend to export lower-quality goods.
There is direct evidence that entering and exiting items are of lower 
quality than continuing goods. Mandel (2010) finds that U.S. goods that 
cease to be exported are of lower quality. In a later work, Mandel (2013) 
finds that Chinese exporters to the United States entered at low quality.
I mpact of sampling 
These data do not allow us to assess the quantitative impact of 
sampling, since we cannot identify which goods are excluded from 
the sample. However, we can do a back-of-the-envelope calculation to 
get a sense of quantitative impact. I examine the impact of trade cost 
changes for low- and high-quality goods. Specifically, I compare what 
the theory predicts the new prices would be if F s changed to ,sF . To 
parameterize the exercise, I use new and old goods in 2004 as reported 
in Bridgman (2013). I identify old and new goods as high- and low-
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quality goods, respectively. Their prices are po(H) and po(L). (H and L 
stand for high and low.)
Equation (4.19) gives us a(i)wo. Using the price equation, we can 
calculate  op i  for  ,i H L , the predicted price when F
s changes to 
Fs,′ and all other quantities are held constant.
If trade costs Fs and τ are the same for high- and low-quality goods, 
which is the case for new and old goods in 2004, the relative growth 
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Therefore, high-quality goods are half as responsive to a change in 
specific trade costs.
While this example is quite stylized, it indicates that there can be 
significant differences in price responsiveness among goods of different 
quality. Using only high-quality goods will tend to underestimate price 
changes.
There are forces mitigating this effect. Most trade value results 
from trade relationships that are long lasting. If a trade relationship sur-
vives the first few years, the chances that it will end fall significantly 
(Besedes and Prusa 2010).
Trade relationships in differentiated goods tend to be longer. Besedes 
and Prusa (2006b) compare trade duration for goods in organized mar-
kets with differentiated goods using the classification reported in Rauch 
(1999). Trade relationships for commodities traded in organized mar-
kets tend to be shorter, since such markets lower the cost of switching. 
These are the goods for which the measurement issues resulting from 
quality differences are less important.
The impact on aggregate trade measurement is probably small. 
Most trade value is not impacted by this effect. However, it may have 
an impact on subindices. The price gap between new and old goods 
has been increasing, suggesting that the scope for mismeasurement is 
increasing.
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This increasing scope of mismeasurement could have an impact on 
some of the other uses of trade prices, aside from deflating trade. For 
instance, it may have a role in explaining the low responsiveness of 
trade prices to exchange rates. Nakamura and Steinsson (2012) note 
that trade quotes change very little over time. The items that tend to be 
included in the price sample are those that are the least affected by cost 
shocks.
CONCLUSIO N
This chapter shows theoretically that two frequently used tech-
niques in international price measurement, matched modeling and 
dropping intermittently traded goods from the sample, will mismeasure 
prices when there are quality-differentiated goods and specific trade 
costs. Specific costs weaken the link between a good’s quality and its 
price. This effect causes matched modeling to overstate the quality of 
low-quality goods. Intermittently traded goods are typically low-quality 
goods, those whose prices are the most sensitive to shocks. Removing 
them from the sample will understate price movements. These effects 
may lead us to overstate the amount of trade from new, low-income 
exporters, since they tend to produce lower-quality goods. Determining 
the extent of this overstatement will require additional work using more 
granular data. However, initial data work indicates that these effects 
may be quantitatively important for some types of goods.
Notes
I thank Jeffrey Blaha, John Greenlees, Larry Lang, and Dave Mead for comments. The 
views expressed in this chapter are solely those of the author and not necessarily those 
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis or the U.S. Department of Commerce. 
 
 1. For example, see Hallak (2006); Hallak and Schott (2011); Henn, Papageorgiou, 
and Spatafora (2013); Hummels and Skiba (2004); Irarrazabal, Moxnes, and 
Opromolla (2011); Manova and Zhang (2012); Martin (2012); and Spearot (2011).
 2. This assumption provides closed-form solutions for prices. As shown in Bridgman 
(2013), the impact of this assumption is small as long as there are a large number 
of varieties sold.
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 3. I thank the BLS’s Jeffery Blaha, Larry Lang, and Dave Mead for extensive assis-
tance in explaining the sampling process.
 4. There are other issues with match modeling. If there are menu costs, firms may use 
the introduction of new models as an opportunity to change prices (Nakamura and 
Steinsson 2012). That concern does not arise in this model, since prices are fully 
flexible and there are no strategic or informational reasons for not adjusting prices. 
Therefore, that literature is complementary to this paper.
 5. Amiti and Davis (2009) use unit values and argue that they are a reasonable proxy 
for broad price movements.
 6. Quality is actually a function of this cost q(i) = a(i)1 + θ. By only examining the 
ratio of the a(i), we do not have to assign a value for θ. This ratio shows the impact 
of specific trade costs on quality measurement, but we would need a value of θ to 
assess the impact on welfare measurement.
 7. This value is the 1974–1988 value for SITC Revision 2 Code 85102, taken from 
the working-paper version (Broda and Weinstein 2004). The published version 
reports elasticities for the more aggregated three-digit SITC level, while the work-
ing paper reports at the five-digit level.
 8. I log both variables to make the figure easier to see. I use 2004, the final year of 
the sample, since it has the most observations.
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